Classical - Quantum Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel: Common
  Randomness Assisted Code and Continuity by Boche, Holger et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
6.
01
76
8v
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
9 D
ec
 20
16
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Classical-Quantum Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel:
Common Randomness Assisted Code and Continuity
Holger Boche · Minglai Cai · Christian
Deppe · Janis Nötzel
the date of receipt and acceptance should be inserted later
Abstract We determine the secrecy capacities under common randomness
assisted coding of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. Fur-
thermore, we determine the secrecy capacity of a mixed channel model which
is compound from the sender to the legitimate receiver and varies arbitrarily
from the sender to the eavesdropper. We examine when the secrecy capac-
ity is a continuous function of the system parameters as an application and
show that resources, e.g., having access to a perfect copy of the outcome of
a random experiment, can guarantee continuity of the capacity function of
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
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1 Introduction
In the last few years, the developments in modern communication systems have
produced many results in a short amount of time. Quantum communication
systems, especially, have developed into a very active field, setting new proper-
ties and limits. Our goal is to deliver a general theory considering both channel
robustness against jamming and security against eavesdropping in quantum
information theory, since many modern communication systems are often not
perfect, but are vulnerable to jamming and eavesdropping. The transmitters
have to solve two main problems. First, the message (a secret key or a secure
message) has to be encoded robustly, i.e., despite channel uncertainty, it can
be decoded correctly by the legitimate receiver. Second, the message has to
be encoded in such a way that the wiretapper’s knowledge of the transmitted
classical message can be kept arbitrarily small. This work is an extension of
our previous paper [22].
In our earlier work [22], we investigated the transmission of messages from
a sending party to a receiving party. The messages were kept secret from an
eavesdropper. Communication took place over a quantum channel which was,
in addition to noise from the environment, subjected to the action of a jammer
which actively manipulated the states. The Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrar-
ily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels has been established, i.e. either
the deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying channel was zero or equal
to its shared randomness assisted capacity. We also analyzed the secrecy capac-
ity of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels when the sender
and the receiver used various resources and studied the helpfulness of certain
resources for robust and secure information transmission. We found out that
even using the weakest non-secure resource (the correlation), one could achieve
the same security capacity using a strong resource as the common randomness.
But, nonetheless, a capacity formula was not given in [22].
In this paper, we carry on our investigation of arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channels and shared randomness. We deliver a capacity
formula for secure information transmission through an arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel using correlation as a resource. Together
with the result of [22], it yields a formula for deterministic secrecy capacity of
the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. Using this formula,
we analyze the stability of secrecy capacity, i.e., we ask under which condition,
it is discontinuous as a function of channel parameters, in other words, when
small variations in the underlying model dramatically change the effect of the
jammer’s actions.
To determine our capacity formula, we follow the idea of [13] and [39]
in the classical cases: At first, we consider a mixed channel model that is
called the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. Then, we ap-
ply Ahlswede’s robustification technique to establish the common randomness
assisted secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap
channel.
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Quantum mechanics differs significantly from classical mechanics; it has its
own laws. A quantum channel is a communication channel which can trans-
mit quantum information. In this paper, we consider the classical-quantum
channels, i.e., the sender’s inputs are classical data and the receiver’s outputs
are quantum systems. The capacity of classical-quantum channels has been
determined in [32] and [38].
In the model of an arbitrarily varying channel, we consider channel uncer-
tainty, i.e. transmission over a channel which is not stationary, but can change
with every use of the channel. We interpret it as a channel with a jammer who
may change his input with every channel use and is not restricted to using
a repetitive probabilistic strategy. It is understood that the sender and the
receiver have to select their coding scheme first. After that, the jammer makes
his choice of the channel state to sabotage the message transmission. However,
due to the physical properties, we consider that the jammer’s changes only take
place in a known set. The arbitrarily varying channel was first introduced in
[17].
As was already mentioned in our earlier work [22], we are interested in
the role that shared randomness plays for the arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channel. This is used in [2], [3], and [4] for the determination
of the random capacity. [2] showed a surprising result which is now known as
the Ahlswede Dichotomy: Either the capacity of an arbitrarily varying chan-
nel is zero, or it equals its shared randomness assisted capacity. After this
discovery, it has remained an open question as to exactly when the determin-
istic capacity is positive. In [29], a sufficient condition for this has been given,
and in [26] it is proved that this condition is also necessary. In [1] it has also
been shown that the capacity of certain arbitrarily varying channels can be
equated to the zero-error capacity of related discrete memoryless channels.
The Ahlswede Dichotomy demonstrates the importance of shared randomness
for communication in a very clear form.
A classical-quantum channel with a jammer is called an arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum channel. The arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel
was introduced in [6]. A lower bound for its capacity has been given. An
alternative proof and a proof of the strong converse are given in [13]. In [5], the
Ahlswede Dichotomy for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels is
established, and a sufficient and necessary condition for the zero deterministic
capacity is given. In [23], a simplification of this condition for the arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum channels is given.
In the model of a wiretap channel, we consider communication with secu-
rity. This was first introduced in [42] (in this paper, we will use a stronger
security criterion than [42]’s security criterion, cf. Remark 2). We interpret
the wiretap channel as a channel with an eavesdropper. The relation of the
different security criteria is discussed, for example, in [19] with some generality
and in [39] with respect to arbitrarily varying channels.
A classical-quantum channel with an eavesdropper is called a classical-
quantum wiretap channel, its secrecy capacity has been determined in [27]
and [25].
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In the model of an arbitrarily varying wiretap channel, we consider trans-
mission with both a jammer and an eavesdropper. Its secrecy capacity has been
analyzed in [16]. A lower bound of the randomness assisted secrecy capacity
has been given.
A classical-quantum channel with both a jammer and an eavesdropper is
called an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. It is defined
as a family of pairs of indexed channels {(Wt, Vt) : t = 1, · · · , T } with a com-
mon input alphabet and possible different output alphabets and connects a
sender with two receivers, a legitimate one and a wiretapper, where t is called
a channel state of the channel pair. The legitimate receiver accesses the out-
put of the first part of the pair, i.e., the first channel Wt in the pair, and the
wiretapper observes the output of the second part, i.e., the second channel Vt,
respectively. A channel state t, which varies from symbol to symbol in an arbi-
trary manner, governs both the legitimate receiver’s channel and the wiretap
channel. A code for the channel conveys information to the legitimate receiver
such that the wiretapper knows nothing about the transmitted information
in the sense of the stronger security criterion (cf. Remark 2). This is a gen-
eralization of compound classical-quantum wiretap channels in [21], when the
channel states are not stationary, but can change over time.
The secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap
channels has been analyzed in [18]. A lower bound of the randomness assisted
capacity has been given, and it has been shown that this bound is either a
lower bound for the deterministic capacity, or else the deterministic capacity
is equal to zero.
References [11] and [10] are two well-known examples for secure quantum
information transmission using quantum key distributions. Good one-shot re-
sults for quantum channels with a wiretapper who is limited in his actions
have been obtained. But our goal is to have a more general theory for channel
security in quantum information theory, i.e., message transmission should be
secure against every possible kind of eavesdropping. Furthermore, we are in-
terested in asymptotic behavior when we deliver a large volume of messages
by many channel uses. Therefore, we consider a new paradigm for the design
of quantum channel systems, which is called embedded security. Instead of
the standard approach in secret communication, i.e. first ensuring a success-
ful transmission of messages and then implementing a cryptographic protocol,
here we embed protocols with a guaranteed security right from the start into
the physical layer, which is the bottom layer of the model of communications
systems. The concept covers both secure message transmission and secure key
generation.
In [23], a classification of various resources is given. A distinction is made
between two extremal cases: randomness and correlation. Randomness is the
strongest resource, and it requires a perfect copy of the outcome of a random
experiment, and thus, we should assume an additional perfect channel. On
the other hand, correlation is the weakest resource. The work [23] also puts
emphasis on the quantification of the differences between correlation and com-
mon randomness and used the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel
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as a method of proof. It can be shown that common randomness is a stronger
resource than correlation in the following sense: An example is given where not
even a finite amount of common randomness can be extracted from a given
correlation. On the contrary, a sufficiently large amount of common random-
ness allows the sender and receiver to asymptotically simulate the statistics of
any correlation.
In view of the aforementioned importance of shared randomness for robust-
ness, it is clear that the shared randomness is not allowed to be known by the
jammer (In stark contrast to this, we assume the eavesdropper has access to the
outcomes of the shared random experiment). Therefore, backward communi-
cation from the eavesdropper to the jammer would render the shared random-
ness completely useless. Thus we concentrate our analysis on the case without
feedback, i.e. the eavesdropper cannot send messages toward the jammer. The
communication from the jammer to the eavesdropper is explicitly possible, i.e.
the eavesdropper could know the jammer’s strategy. It is a challenging task for
future studies when the resource is secure against eavesdropping and two-way
communication between the jammer and the eavesdropper is allowed. In this
case, we have to build a code in such a way that the transmission of both the
message and the randomization is secure.
As an application of our results, we turn to the question: when the secrecy
capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters? The analysis of
the continuity of capacities of quantum channels is raised from the question
whether small changes in the channel system are able to cause dramatic losses
in the performance. The continuity of the message and entanglement trans-
mission capacity of a stationary memoryless quantum channel has been listed
as an open problem in [43] and was solved in [33]. Considering channels with
active jamming faces an especially new difficulty. The reason is that the ca-
pacity in this case is, in general, not specified by entropy quantities. In [24]
it has been shown when the message transmission capacity of an arbitrarily
varying quantum channels is continuous. The condition for continuity of mes-
sage transmission capacity of a classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel
has been given in [39].
As a direct consequence of our capacity formula, we show in this paper
that a sharing resource is very helpful for the channel stability in the sense
that it provides continuity of secrecy capacities.
This paper is organized as follows:
The main definitions are given in Section 2.
In Section 3 we determine a capacity formula for a mixed channel model,
i.e. the enhanced secrecy capacity of compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap
classical-quantum channels. This formula will be used for our result in Section
4.
In Section 4 our main result is presented. In this section we determine the
secrecy capacities under common randomness assisted coding of arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
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As an application of our main result, in Section 5 we discuss when the
secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel
is a continuous quantity of the system parameters.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Notations
For a finite set A, we denote the set of probability distributions on A by P(A).
Let ρ1 and ρ2 be Hermitian operators on a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert
space G. We say ρ1 ≥ ρ2 and ρ2 ≤ ρ1 if ρ1 − ρ2 is positive semidefinite. For
a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space G, we denote the set of density
operators on G by
S(G) := {ρ ∈ L(G) : ρ is Hermitian, ρ ≥ 0G , tr(ρ) = 1} ,
where L(G) is the set of linear operators on G, and 0G is the null matrix on
G. Note that any operator in S(G) is bounded.
For finite-dimensional complex Hilbert spacesG andG′, a quantum channel
N : S(G) → S(G′), S(G) ∋ ρ → N(ρ) ∈ S(G′) is represented by a completely
positive trace-preserving map which accepts input quantum states in S(G)
and produces output quantum states in S(G′).
If the sender wants to transmit a classical message of a finite set A to the
receiver using a quantum channel N , his encoding procedure will include a
classical-to-quantum encoder to prepare a quantum message state ρ ∈ S(G)
suitable as an input for the channel. If the sender’s encoding is restricted to
transmitting an indexed finite set of quantum states {ρx : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(G), then
we can consider the choice of the signal quantum states ρx as a component
of the channel. Thus, we obtain a channel σx := N(ρx) with classical inputs
x ∈ A and quantum outputs, which we call a classical-quantum channel. This
is a mapN: A→ S(G′), A ∋ x→ N(x) ∈ S(G′) which is represented by the set
of |A| possible output quantum states {σx = N(x) := N(ρx) : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(G′),
meaning that each classical input of x ∈ A leads to a distinct quantum output
σx ∈ S(G′). In view of this, we have the following definition.
Let A be a finite set and H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space.
A classical-quantum channel is a linear map W : P(A) → S(H), P(A) ∋ P →
W (P ) ∈ S(H). Let a ∈ A. For a Pa ∈ P(A), defined by Pa(a′) =
{
1 if a′ = a
0 if a′ 6= a ,
we write W (a) instead of W (Pa).
Remark 1 In much literature, a classical-quantum channel is defined as a map
A → S(H), A ∋ a → W (a) ∈ S(H). This is a special case when the input is
limited on the set {Pa : a ∈ A}.
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For a probability distribution P on a finite set A and a positive constant
δ, we denote the set of typical sequences by
TnP,δ :=
{
an ∈ An : | 1
n
N(a′ | an)− P (a′)| ≤ δ
n
∀a′ ∈ A
}
,
where N(a′ | an) is the number of occurrences of the symbol a′ in the sequence
an.
Let n ∈ N. we define An := {(a1, · · · , an) : ai ∈ A ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}}. The
space which the vectors {v1⊗· · ·⊗vn : vi ∈ H ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}} span is denoted
by H⊗n. We also write an for the elements of An.
Associated to W is the channel map on the n-block W⊗n: P (An) →
S(H⊗n), such that W⊗n(Pn) = W (P1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ W (Pn) if Pn ∈ P(An) can
be given by Pn(an) =
∏
j Pj(aj) for every a
n = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ An. Let θ :=
{1, · · · , T } be a finite set. Let
{
Wt : t ∈ θ
}
be a set of classical-quantum
channels. For tn = (t1, · · · , tn), ti ∈ θ we define the n-block Wtn such that
for Wtn(P
n) = Wt1(P1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Wtn(Pn) if Pn ∈ P(An) can be given by
Pn(an) =
∏
j Pj(aj) for every a
n ∈ An.
For a quantum state ρ ∈ S(G) we denote the von Neumann entropy of ρ
by
S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ) .
Let P and Q be quantum systems. We denote the Hilbert space of P and
Q by GP and GQ, respectively. Let φPQ be a bipartite quantum state in
S(GPQ). We denote the partial trace over GP by
trP(φ
PQ) :=
∑
l
〈l|PφPQ|l〉P ,
where {|l〉P : l} is an orthonormal basis of GP. We denote the conditional
entropy by
S(P | Q)φ := S(φPQ)− S(φQ) .
The quantum mutual information is denoted by
I(P;Q)φ = S(φ
P) + S(φQ)− S(φPQ) .
Here φQ = trP(φ
PQ) and φP = trQ(φ
PQ). Let V: A → S(G) be a classical-
quantum channel. Following [7], for P ∈ P (A) the conditional entropy of the
channel for V with input distribution P is denoted by
S(V|P ) :=
∑
x∈A
P (x)S(V(x)) .
Let Φ := {ρa : a ∈ A} be a set of quantum states labeled by elements of A.
For a probability distribution P on A, the Holevo χ quantity is defined as
χ(P ;Φ) := S
(∑
a∈A
P (a)ρa
)
−
∑
a∈A
P (a)S (ρa) .
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For a set A and a Hilbert space G, letV: A → S(G) be a classical-quantum
channel. For a probability distribution P on A, the Holevo χ quantity of the
channel for V with input distribution P is defined as
χ(V;Φ) := S (V(P ))− S (V|P ) .
Let G be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. Let n ∈ N and α > 0.
We suppose ρ ∈ S(G) has the spectral decomposition ρ = ∑x P (x)|x〉〈x|.
Notice that by definition of the spectral decomposition, the eigenvectors {|x〉 :
x} form an orthonormal system (sometimes also called the “computational
basis”). Its α-typical subspace is the subspace spanned by
{|xn〉 : xn ∈ TnP,α},
where |xn〉 := ⊗ni=1|xi〉. The orthogonal subspace projector onto the typical
subspace is
Πρ,α =
∑
xn∈TnP,α
|xn〉〈xn| .
Similarly let A be a finite set, andG be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert
space. Let V: A → S(G) be a classical-quantum channel. For a ∈ A, suppose
V(a) has the spectral decomposition V(a) =
∑
j V (j|a)|j〉a〈j|a for a stochastic
matrix V (·|·). In an effort to enhance readability, we will typically suppress
the subscript a in the above decomposition and typically write
∑
j V (j|a)|j〉〈j|
whenever this causes no ambiguity. The same reasoning applies to the next
definition. The α-conditional typical subspace of V for a typical sequence an
is the subspace spanned by
{⊗
a∈A |jI〉a : jIa ∈ TIaV (·|a),δ
}
. Here Ia := {i ∈
{1, · · · , n} : ai = a} is an indicator set that selects the indices i in the sequence
an = (a1, · · · , an) for which the ith symbol ai is equal to a ∈ A. The subspace
is often referred to as the α-conditional typical subspace of the state V⊗n(an).
The orthogonal subspace projector onto it is defined as
ΠV,α(a
n) =
⊗
a∈A
∑
jIa∈TIa
V(·|an),α
|jIa〉〈jIa | .
The typical subspace has following properties:
For σ ∈ S(G⊗n) and α > 0, there are positive constants β(α), γ(α), and
δ(α), depending on α, such that
tr (σΠσ,α) > 1− 2−nβ(α) , (1)
2n(S(σ)−δ(α)) ≤ tr (Πσ,α) ≤ 2n(S(σ)+δ(α)) , (2)
2−n(S(σ)+γ(α))Πσ,α ≤ Πσ,ασΠσ,α ≤ 2−n(S(σ)−γ(α))Πσ,α . (3)
For an ∈ TnP,α, there are positive constants β(α)′, γ(α)′, and δ(α)′, de-
pending on α such that
tr
(
V
⊗n(an)ΠV,α(an)
)
> 1− 2−nβ(α)′ , (4)
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2−n(S(V|P )+γ(α)
′)ΠV,α(a
n) ≤ ΠV,α(an)V⊗n(an)ΠV,α(an)
≤ 2−n(S(V|P )−γ(α)′)ΠV,α(an) , (5)
2n(S(V|P )−δ(α)
′) ≤ tr (ΠV,α(an)) ≤ 2n(S(V|P )+δ(α)
′) . (6)
For the classical-quantum channel V : P(A) → S(G) and a probability
distribution P on A, we define a quantum state PV := V(P ) on S(G). For
α > 0, we define an orthogonal subspace projector ΠPV,α fulfilling (1), (2),
and (3). Let xn ∈ TnP,α. For ΠPV,α, there is a positive constant β(α)′′ such
that following inequality holds:
tr
(
V
⊗n(xn) ·ΠPV,α
) ≥ 1− 2−nβ(α)′′ . (7)
We give here a sketch of the proof. For a detailed proof, please see [40].
Proof (1) holds because tr (σΠσ,α) = tr (Πσ,ασΠσ,α) = P (T
n
P,α). (2) holds
because tr (Πσ,α) =
∣∣TnP,α∣∣. (3) holds because 2−n(S(σ)+γ(α)) ≤ Pn(xn) ≤
2−n(S(σ)−γ(α)) for x ∈ TnP,α and a positive γ(α). (4), (5), and (6) can be
obtained in similar way. (7) follows from the permutation-invariance of ΠPV,α.
⊓⊔
2.2 Communication Scenarios and Code Concepts
Definition 1 Let A be a finite set, let H be a finite-dimensional complex
Hilbert space, and θ := {1, · · · , T } be an index set. For every t ∈ θ, let Wt
be a classical-quantum channel P(A) → S(H). We call the set of the classical-
quantum channels {Wt : t ∈ θ} an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
channel when the channel state t varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary
manner.
When the sender inputs a sequence an ∈ An into the channel, the receiver
receives the output Wnt (a
n) ∈ S(H⊗n), where tn = (t1, t2, · · · , tn) ∈ θn is the
channel state of Wnt .
Definition 2 We say that the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel
{Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable if there exists a parametrized set of distribu-
tions {τ(· | a) : a ∈ A} on θ such that for all a, a′ ∈ A,∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a)Wt(a′) =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a′)Wt(a) .
When the sender inputs a sequence an ∈ An into the channel, the receiver
receives the output W⊗nt (a
n) ∈ S(H⊗n), where tn = (t1, t2, · · · , tn) ∈ θn
is the channel state, while the wiretapper receives an output quantum state
V ⊗nt (a
n) ∈ S(H ′⊗n).
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Definition 3 Let A be a finite set. Let H and H ′ be finite-dimensional com-
plex Hilbert spaces. Let θ := {1, 2, · · · } be an index set. For every t ∈ θ,
let Wt be a classical-quantum channel P(A) → S(H) and Vt be a classical-
quantum channel P(A) → S(H ′). We call the set of the classical-quantum
channel pairs {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel when the state t varies from symbol to symbol in an ar-
bitrary manner, while the legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first
channel, i.e., Wt in the pair (Wt, Vt), and the wiretapper observes the output
of the second channel, i.e., Vt in the pair (Wt, Vt), respectively.
Definition 4 Let A be a finite set. Let H and H ′ be finite-dimensional com-
plex Hilbert spaces. Let θ := {1, 2, · · · } and θ := {1, 2, · · · } be index sets. For
every s ∈ θ let W s be a classical-quantum channel P(A) → S(H). For every
t ∈ θ let Vt be a classical-quantum channel P(A) → S(H ′). We call the set of
the classical-quantum channel pairs {(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ} a compound-
arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel, when the chan-
nel state s remains constant over time, but the legitimate users can not control
which s in the set θ will be used and the state t varies from symbol to symbol
in an arbitrary manner, while the legitimate receiver accesses the output of
the first channel, i.e., W s in the pair (W s, Vt) and the wiretapper observes the
output of the second channel, i.e., Vt in the pair (W s, Vt), respectively.
Definition 5 An (n, Jn) (deterministic) code C for a classical-quantum
channel consists of a stochastic encoder E : {1, · · · , Jn} → P(An), specified
by a matrix of conditional probabilities E(·|·) and a collection of positive-
semidefinite operators {Dj : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}} ⊂ S(H⊗n), which is a partition
of the identity, i.e.,
∑Jn
j=1Dj = idH⊗n . We call these operators the decoder
operators.
A code is created by the sender and the legitimate receiver before the message
transmission starts. The sender uses the encoder to encode the message that
he wants to send, while the legitimate receiver uses the decoder operators on
the channel output to decode the message.
Definition 6 An (n, Jn) randomness assisted quantum code for the ar-
bitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is a dis-
tribution G on (Λ, σ), where we denote the set of (n, Jn) deterministic codes
by Λ and σ is a sigma-algebra so chosen such that the functions γ → Pe(Cγ , tn)
and γ → χ (Runi;ZCγ ,tn) are both G-measurable with respect to σ for every
tn ∈ θn, here ZCγ ,tn := {Vtn(Eγ(· | 1)), Vtn(Eγ(· | 2)), · · · , Vtn(Eγ(· | Jn))}.
Definition 7 A non-negative number R is an achievable (deterministic) se-
crecy rate for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantumwiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ} if for every ǫ > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exists an
(n, Jn) code C =
(
E, {Dnj : j = 1, · · · Jn}
)
such that log Jnn > R− δ, and
max
tn∈θn
Pe(C, tn) < ǫ , (8)
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max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi;Ztn) < ζ , (9)
where Runi is the uniform distribution on {1, · · ·Jn}. Here Pe(C, tn) (the av-
erage probability of the decoding error of a deterministic code C, when the
channel state of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel
{(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is tn = (t1, t2, · · · , tn)), is defined as
Pe(C, tn) := 1− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(Wtn(E( |j))Dj) ,
and Ztn =
{
Vtn(E( |i)) : i ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}
}
is the set of the resulting quantum
state at the output of the wiretap channel when the channel state of {(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ} is tn.
Remark 2 A weaker and widely used security criterion is obtained if we replace
(9) with maxt∈θ 1nχ (Runi;Ztn) < ζ. In this paper, we will follow [15] and use
(9).
Definition 8 An (n, Jn) common randomness assisted quantum code
for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}
is a finite subset
{
Cγ = {(Eγ , Dγj ) : j = 1, · · · , Jn} : γ ∈ Γ
}
of the set of
(n, Jn) deterministic codes, labeled by a finite set Γ .
Definition 9 A non-negative number R is an achievable enhanced secrecy
rate for the compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel
{(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ} if for every ǫ > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently
large n there exists an (n, Jn) code C =
(
En, {Dnj : j = 1, · · ·Jn}
)
such that
log Jn
n > R− δ, and
max
s∈θ
Pe(C, s, n) < ǫ , (10)
max
tn∈θn
max
π∈Πn
χ (Runi;Ztn,π) < ζ , (11)
where Runi is the uniform distribution on {1, · · ·Jn}. Here Pe(C, s, n) is defined
as follows
Pe(C, s, n) := 1− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(W
⊗n
s (E
n( |j))Dnj ) ,
and Ztn,π =
{∑
an∈An E
n(π(an)|1)V tn(π(an)),∑an∈An En(π(an)|2)V tn(π(an)),
· · · , ∑an∈An En(π(an)|Jn)V tn(π(an))}.
12 Holger Boche et al.
Definition 10 A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for
{(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ} if for every ǫ > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently
large n there exists an (n, Jn) code C =
(
En, {Dnj : j = 1, · · ·Jn}
)
such that
log Jn
n > R− δ, and
max
s∈θ
Pe(C, s, n) < ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
max
π∈Πn
χ (Runi;Ztn) < ζ .
Definition 11 A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for
the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}
under common randomness assisted quantum coding if for every δ >
0, ζ > 0, and ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large there is an (n, Jn) common
randomness assisted quantum code ({Cγ : γ ∈ Γ}) such that log Jnn > R − δ,
and
max
tn∈θn
1
|Γ |
|Γ |∑
γ=1
Pe(Cγ , tn) < ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
1
|Γ |
|Γ |∑
γ=1
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) < ζ .
This means that we do not require common randomness to be secure against
eavesdropping.
Definition 12 Let X and Y be finite sets. We denote the sets of joint prob-
ability distributions on X and Y by P (X,Y). Let (X,Y ) be a random vari-
able distributed to a joint probability distribution p ∈ P (X,Y). An (X,Y )-
correlation assisted (n, Jn) code C(X,Y ) for the arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channel (Wt, Vt)t∈θ consists of a set of stochastic encoders
{Exn : {1, · · · , Jn} → P(An) : xn ∈ Xn}, and a set of collections of positive
semidefinite operators
{
{D(yn)j : j = 1, · · · , Jn} : yn ∈ Yn
}
on S(H⊗n) which
fulfills
∑Jn
j=1D
(yn)
j = idH⊗n for every y
n ∈ Yn.
R is an achievable (X,Y ) secrecy rate for (Wt, Vt)t∈θ if for every positive
ǫ, δ, ζ and sufficiently large n there exist an (X,Y )-correlation assisted (n, Jn)
code C(X,Y ) =
{(
Exn , D
(yn)
j
)
: j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}, xn ∈ Xn, yn ∈ Yn
}
such
that log Jnn > R− δ, and
max
tn∈θn
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yn∈Yn
p(xn, yn)Pe(C(x
n, yn), tn) < ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
∑
xn∈Xn
pX
⊗n(xn)χ (Runi;Ztn,xn) < ζ ,
where Pe(C(x
n, yn), tn) := 1− 1Jn
∑Jn
j=1
∑
an∈An Exn(a
n|j)tr(Wtn(an)D(y
n)
j ).
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Definition 13 The supremum of all achievable (deterministic) secrecy rates
of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is called the (deterministic) secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ}, denoted by Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}).
The supremum of all achievable secrecy rates under common randomness
assisted quantum coding of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is called the common randomness
assisted secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}, denoted by Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈
θ}; cr).
The supremum of all achievable enhanced secrecy rates of {(W s, Vt) : s ∈
θ, t ∈ θ} is called the enhanced secrecy capacity of {(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ},
denoted by Cˆs({(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ}).
The supremum of all achievable (X,Y ) secrecy rate of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is
called the (X,Y ) secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}.
3 Compound-Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Classical-Quantum
Channel
Let A, H , H ′, θ, and (Wt, Vt)t∈θ be defined as in Section 2.
Following the idea of [39], we first prove the following Theorem.
Theorem 1 Let θ := {1, · · · , T} and θ := {1, · · · , T } be finite index sets. Let
{(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ} be a compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-
quantum channel. We have
Cˆs({(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ})
= lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Λn
(
min
s∈θ
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
s )− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
, (12)
where Bs are the resulting quantum states at the output of the legitimate re-
ceiver’s channels. Ztn are the resulting quantum states at the output of wire-
tap channels. By maxΛn , we mean that the maximum is taken over all en-
sembles that arise from taking an arbitrary finite set U and defining ensembles
{pU (u),
∑
an∈An pAn|U (a
n|u)W⊗ns (an)}u∈U and {pU (u),
∑
an∈An pAn|U(a
n|u)Vtn(an)}u∈U
for every s ∈ θ, and tn ∈ θn to calculate the respective Holevo quantities. An is
here a random variable taking values on An, U a random variable taking val-
ues on U with probability distribution pU , and pAn|U ∈ P (An) the conditional
distribution of An given U .
Proof We fix a probability distribution p ∈ P(A). Let
Jn = ⌊2nmins∈θ χ(p;Bs)−logLn−2nµ⌋ .
Let p′(xn) :=
{
pn(xn)
pn(Tn
p,δ
) , if x
n ∈ Tnp,δ ;
0 , else .
Let Xn := {Xj,l}j∈{1,...,Jn},l∈{1,...,Ln} be a family of random variables tak-
ing value according to p′, i.e., with the uniform distribution over TnP,δ. Here
Ln is a natural number which will be specified later.
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We fix a tn ∈ θn and define a map V : P(θ)× P(A) → S(H) by
V(t, p) := Vt(p) .
For t ∈ θ we define q(t) := N(t|tn)n . tn is trivially a typical sequence of q. For
p ∈ P(A), V defines a map V(·, p) : P(θ) → S(H).
Let
Qtn(x
n) := ΠV(·,p),α(t
n)ΠV,α(t
n, xn) · Vtn(xn) ·ΠV,α(tn, xn)ΠV(·,p),α(tn) .
Lemma 1 (Gentle Operator, cf. [41] and [36]) Let ρ be a quantum state
and X be a positive operator with X ≤ I and 1− tr(ρX) ≤ λ ≤ 1. Then
‖ρ−
√
Xρ
√
X‖1 ≤
√
2λ . (13)
The Gentle Operator was first introduced in [41], where it has been shown
that ‖ρ−
√
Xρ
√
X‖1 ≤
√
8λ. In [36], the result of [41] has been improved, and
(13) has been proved.
In view of the fact that ΠV(·,p),α(tn) and ΠV,α(tn, xn) are both projection
matrices, by (1), (7), and Lemma 1 for any t and xn, it holds that
‖Qtn(xn)− Vtn(xn)‖1 ≤
√
2−nβ(α) + 2−nβ(α)′′ . (14)
The following Lemma was first given in [7]. Here we cite the lemma as it
was formulated in [40].
Lemma 2 (Covering Lemma) Let V be a finite-dimensional Hilbert space.
Let M be a finite set. Suppose we have an ensemble {ρm : m ∈ M} ⊂ S(V) of
quantum states. Let p be a probability distribution on M.
Suppose a total subspace projector Π and codeword subspace projectors
{Πm : m ∈ M} exist which project onto subspaces of the Hilbert space in
which the states exist, and for all m ∈ M there are positive constants ǫ ∈]0, 1[,
D, d such that the following conditions hold:
tr(ρmΠ) ≥ 1− ǫ ,
tr(ρmΠm) ≥ 1− ǫ ,
tr(Π) ≤ D ,
ΠmρmΠm ≤ 1
d
Πm .
We denote ρ :=
∑
m p(m)ρm. We define a sequence of i.i.d. random vari-
ables X1, . . . , XL, taking values in {ρm : m ∈ M}. If L≫ dD , then
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Pr
(
‖L−1
L∑
l=1
Π ·ΠXl ·Xl ·ΠXl ·Π − ρ‖1 ≤ ǫ+ 4
√
ǫ+ 24 4
√
ǫ
)
≥ 1− 2D exp
(
− ǫ
3Ld
2 ln 2D
)
. (15)
For our result we use an alternative Covering Lemma.
Lemma 3 Let V be a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. Let M and M′ ⊂ M be
finite sets. Suppose we have an ensemble {ρm : m ∈ M} ⊂ S(V) of quantum
states. Let p be a probability distribution on M.
Suppose a total subspace projector Π and codeword subspace projectors
{Πm : m ∈ M} exist which project onto subspaces of the Hilbert space in
which the states exist, and for all m ∈ M′ there are positive constants ǫ ∈]0, 1[,
D, d such that the following conditions hold:
tr(ρmΠ) ≥ 1− ǫ ,
tr(ρmΠm) ≥ 1− ǫ ,
tr(Π) ≤ D ,
and
ΠmρmΠm ≤ 1
d
Πm .
We denote ω :=
∑
m∈M′ p(m)ρm. Notice that ω is not a density operator
in general. We define a sequence of i.i.d. random variables X1, . . . , XL, taking
values in {ρm : m ∈ M}. If L≫ dD then
Pr
(
‖L−1
L∑
i=1
Π ·ΠXi ·Xi ·ΠXi ·Π − ω‖1
≤ 1− p(M′) + 4
√
1− p(M′) + 42 8√ǫ
)
≥ 1− 2D exp
(
−p(M′) ǫ
3Ld
2 ln 2D
)
. (16)
Proof We define a function 1M′ : M→ M′ ∪ {0V} by
1M′(ρm) :=
{
ρm , if m ∈ M′
0V , if m ∈ M′ ,
where 0V is the zero operator on V , i.e., 〈j|0V |j〉 = 0 for all j ∈ V . Notice that
0V is not a density operator.
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We have
tr
(∑
m∈M
p(m)1M′(ρm)
)
= tr
( ∑
m∈M′
p(m)ρm
)
=
∑
m∈M′
p(m)tr (ρm)
= p(M′) . (17)
Let Πˆ be the projector onto the subspace spanned by the eigenvectors of∑
m∈M′ p(m)ΠΠmρmΠmΠ whose corresponding eigenvalues are greater than
p(M′) ǫD .
The following three inequalities can be shown by the same arguments as
in the proof of Lemma 2 in [40]:
∑
m∈M
p(m)d · ΠˆΠΠm1M′(ρm)ΠmΠΠˆ ≥ p(M′)dǫ
D
Πˆ . (18)
‖
∑
m∈M
p(m)Π ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·Π −
∑
m∈M
p(m) · 1M′(ρm)‖1
≤
∑
m∈M′
p(m)‖Π ·Πmρm ·Πm ·Π − ρm‖1
≤
∑
m∈M′
p(m)
(
2
√
ǫ+ 2
√
ǫ+ 2
√
ǫ
)
= p(M′)
(
2
√
ǫ + 2
√
ǫ+ 2
√
ǫ
)
≤ 2√ǫ+ 2
√
ǫ+ 2
√
ǫ
≤ 6 4√ǫ . (19)
The last inequality holds because
√
ǫ+ 2
√
ǫ ≤ 2 4√ǫ for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1.
When {ρ1, · · · , ρL} fulfills
(1 − ǫ)
∑
m∈M
p(m)ΠˆΠ ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·ΠΠˆ
≤ L−1
L∑
i=1
ΠˆΠ ·Πρi · (1M′(ρi)) ·Πρi ·ΠΠˆ
≤ (1 + ǫ)
∑
m∈M
p(m)ΠˆΠ ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·ΠΠˆ ,
(i.e. we assume the event considered in (22) below),
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then
‖L−1
L∑
i=1
ΠˆΠ ·Πρi · (1M′(ρi)) ·Πρi ·ΠΠˆ
−
∑
m∈M
p(m)ΠˆΠ ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·ΠΠˆ‖1
≤ ǫ . (20)
i) Application of the Operator Chernoff Bound
For all m ∈ M′ we have
d · ΠˆΠΠm1M′(ρm)ΠmΠΠˆ
= d · ΠˆΠΠmρmΠmΠΠˆ
≤ Πˆ (21)
as a consequence of the inequality A†BA ≤ A†A which is valid whenever
B ≤ id.
By (21) and the fact that d · 0V ≤ Πˆ , we have for all m ∈ M.
0V ≤ d · ΠˆΠΠm1M′(ρm)ΠmΠΠˆ ≤ Πˆ .
Now we apply the Operator Chernoff Bound (cf. [40]) on the set of oper-
ator {d1M′(ρm) : m ∈ M}} and the subspace spanned by the eigenvectors of∑
m∈M′ p(m)ΠΠmρmΠΠm whose corresponding eigenvalues are greater than
p(M′) ǫD ; here Πˆ acts as the identity on the subspace.
By (18) we obtain
Pr
(
(1− ǫ)
∑
m∈M
p(m)ΠˆΠ ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·ΠΠˆ
≤ L−1
L∑
i=1
ΠˆΠ ·ΠXi · (1M′(Xi)) ·ΠXi ·ΠΠˆ
≤ (1 + ǫ)L−1
L∑
i=1
ΠˆΠ ·ΠXi · (1M′(Xi)) ·ΠXi ·ΠΠˆ
= Pr
(
d(1− ǫ)
∑
m∈M
p(m)ΠˆΠ ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·ΠΠˆ
≤ dL−1
L∑
i=1
ΠˆΠ ·ΠXi · (1M′(Xi)) ·ΠXi ·ΠΠˆ
≤ d(1 + ǫ)
∑
m∈M
p(m)ΠˆΠ ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·ΠΠˆ
)
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≥ 1− 2D exp
(
−p(M′) ǫ
3Ld
2 ln 2D
)
. (22)
ii) Upper Bound for ‖∑m∈M p(m)1M′(ρm)−∑m∈M p(m)ΠˆΠΠm1M′(ρm)ΠmΠΠˆ‖1
Let
∑
i λi|i〉〈i| be a spectral decomposition of
∑
m∈M′
p(m)
p(M′)ΠΠmρmΠmΠ .
In view of the fact that Πˆ is the projector onto the subspace spanned by the
eigenvectors of the density operator
∑
m∈M′
p(m)
p(M′)ΠΠmρmΠmΠ whose corre-
sponding eigenvalues are greater than ǫD , we have
tr
(∑
m∈M
p(m)
p(M′)
Π ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·Π
)
− tr
(∑
m∈M
p(m)
p(M′)
ΠˆΠ ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·ΠΠˆ
)
=
∑
λi≥ ǫD
λi
≤ ǫ .
We apply the gentle operator lemma (cf. [40]) to obtain
‖
∑
m∈M
p(m)Π ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·Π −
∑
m∈M
p(m)ΠˆΠ ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·ΠΠˆ‖1
= p(M′)‖
∑
m∈M
p(m)
p(M′)
Π ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·Π −
∑
m∈M
p(m)
p(M′)
ΠˆΠ ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·ΠΠˆ‖1
≤ 2
√
ǫ+ 2
√
ǫ
≤ 4 4√ǫ . (23)
When {ρ1, · · · , ρL} fulfills
‖L−1
L∑
i=1
ΠˆΠ ·Πi · (1M′(ρi)) ·Πi ·ΠΠˆ
−
∑
m∈M
p(m)ΠˆΠ ·Πm · 1M′(ρm) ·Πm ·ΠΠˆ‖1
≤ ǫ
(i.e. we assume the event considered in (22) occurs and thus (20) holds), then
by (19) and (23) it holds that
‖L−1
L∑
i=1
ΠˆΠ ·Πi · (1M′(ρi)) ·Πi ·ΠΠˆ −
∑
m∈M
p(m)1M′(ρm)‖1
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≤ ǫ+ 10 4√ǫ
≤ 11 4√ǫ . (24)
iii) Upper Bound for ‖L−1∑Li=1ΠΠi(1M′(ρi))ΠiΠ−L−1∑Li=1 ΠˆΠΠi(1M′(ρi))ΠiΠΠˆ‖1
When the event considered in (22) is true, i.e., when (24) holds, then by
(17)
tr
(
L−1
L∑
i=1
ΠˆΠ ·Πi · (1M′(ρi)) ·Πi ·ΠΠˆ
)
≥ p(M′)− 11 4√ǫ .
We apply the gentle operator lemma (cf. [40]) to obtain
‖L−1
L∑
i=1
ΠˆΠ ·Πi · (1M′(ρi)) ·Πi ·ΠΠˆ − L−1
L∑
i=1
Π ·Πi · (1M′(ρi)) ·Πi ·Π‖1
≤ 2
√
1− p(M′) + 11 4√ǫ
≤ 2
√
1− p(M′) + 22 8√ǫ . (25)
The last inequality holds because
√
a+ b ≤ √a+
√
b for positive a and b.
iv) Upper Bound for ‖L−1∑Li=1ΠΠiρiΠiΠ−L−1∑Li=1ΠΠi(1M′(ρi))ΠiΠ‖1
In view of the fact that Π and Πi are projection matrices for every ρi
∈ {ρ1, · · · , ρL} it holds that
tr(ΠiρlΠi) ≤ tr(ρl) = 1
and
tr(L−1
L∑
i=1
ΠΠiρlΠiΠ)
≤ tr(L−1
L∑
i=1
ΠiρlΠi)
≤ 1 .
When {ρ1, · · · , ρL} fulfills
‖L−1
L∑
i=1
Π ·Πi · (1M′(ρi)) ·Πi ·Π −
∑
m∈M
p(m)1M′(ρm)‖1
≤ 2
√
1− p(M′) + 20 8√ǫ ,
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i.e., we assume that the event considered in (22) is true, and then by (17) and
the triangle inequality, we have
tr (Π ·Πi · (1M′(ρi)) ·Πi ·Π)
≥ p(M′)− 2
√
1− p(M′)− 20 8√ǫ . (26)
Since
L−1
L∑
i=1
Π ·Πi · ρi ·Πi ·Π
= L−1
L∑
i=1
Π ·Πi · 1M′(ρi) ·Πi ·Π
+ L−1
∑
i/∈M′
Π ·Πi · ρi ·Πi ·Π , (27)
we have
‖L−1
∑
i/∈M′
Π ·Πi · ρi ·Πi ·Π‖1
= tr
(
L−1
∑
i/∈M′
Π ·Πi · ρi ·Πi ·Π
)
≤ 1− p(M′) + 2
√
1− p(M′) + 20 8√ǫ , (28)
which implies
‖L−1
L∑
i=1
Π ·Πi · ρi ·Πi ·Π −
∑
m∈M
p(m)1M′(ρm)‖1
≤ 1− p(M′) + 4
√
1− p(M′) + 42 8√ǫ . (29)
By (29), we have
Pr
(
‖L−1
L∑
i=1
Π ·ΠXi ·Xi ·ΠXi ·Π −
∑
m∈M
p(m) · 1M′(ρm)‖1
≤ 1− p(M′) + 4
√
1− p(M′) + 42 8√ǫ
)
≥ 1− 2D exp
(
−p(M′) ǫ
3Ld
2 ln 2D
)
. (30)
⊓⊔
By (2), we have
tr(ΠV(·,p),α(tn))
Classical-Quantum Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel 21
≤ 2n(S(V(·,p)|q)+δ(α))
= 2n(
∑
t q(t)V(t,p)+δ(α))
= 2n(
∑
t q(t)S(Vt(p))+δ(α)) . (31)
Furthermore, for all xn it holds that
ΠV,α(t
n, xn)Vtn(x
n)ΠV,α(t
n, xn)
≤ 2−n(S(V|r)+δ(α)′)ΠV,α(tn, xn)
= 2−n(
∑
t,x r(t,x)S(V(t,x))+δ(α)
′)ΠV,α(t
n, xn) . (32)
We define
θ′ :=
{
t ∈ θ : nq(t) ≥ √n} .
By properties of classical typical set (cf. [41]). there is a positive βˆ(α) such
that
Pr
p′
(
xn ∈
{
xn ∈ An : (xIt) ∈ Tnq(t)p,δ ∀t ∈ θ′
})
≥
(
1− 2−
√
nβˆ(α)
)|θ|
≥ 1−2−
√
n 12 βˆ(α) ,
(33)
where It := {i ∈ {1, · · · , n} : ti = t} is an indicator set that selects the indices
i in the sequence tn = (t1, · · · , tn).
We denote the set {xn : (xIt) ∈ Tnq(t)p,δ ∀t ∈ θ′} ⊂ An by Mtn . For all
xn ∈ Mtn , if n is sufficiently large, we have∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t,x
r(t, x)S(V(t, x)) −
∑
t
q(t)S(Vt|p)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t∈θ′,x
r(t, x)S(V(t, x)) −
∑
t∈θ′
q(t)S(Vt|p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t/∈θ′,x
r(t, x)S(V(t, x)) −
∑
t/∈θ′
q(t)S(Vt|p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
t∈θ′
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x
r(t, x)S(V(t, x)) − q(t)S(Vt|p)
∣∣∣∣∣+ 2|θ| 1√nC
≤ 2|θ| δ
n
C + 2|θ| 1√
n
C , (34)
where C := maxt∈θ maxx∈A(S(V(t, x)) + S(Vt|p)).
We set Θtn :=
∑
xn∈Mtn p(x
n)Qtn(x
n). For given zn ∈ Mtn and tn ∈ θn,
〈zn|Θtn |zn〉 is the expected value of 〈zn|Qtn(xn)|zn〉 under the condition xn ∈
Mtn .
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We choose a positive β¯(α) such that β¯(α) ≤ min(2−nβ(α), 2−nβ(α)′), and
set ǫ := 2−nβ¯(α). In view of (32), we now apply Lemma 3, where we consider
the set Mtn ⊂ An: If n is sufficiently large, for all j we have
Pr
(
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(Xj,l)−Θtn‖1 > 2−
√
n 18 βˆ(α) + 40 8
√
ǫ
)
≤ 2n(
∑
t,x r(t,x)S(V(t,x))+δ(α))
· exp
(
−Ln ǫ
3
2 ln 2
(1− 2−
√
n 12 βˆ(α)) · 2n(
∑
t q(t)S(Vt(p))−
∑
t q(t)S(Vt|p))+δ(α)+δ(α)′+2|θ| δnC+2|θ| 1√nC
)
= 2n(
∑
t,x r(t,x)S(V(t,x))+δ(α)
· exp
(
−Ln ǫ
3
2 ln 2
· (1− 2−
√
n 12 βˆ(α))2
n(−∑t q(t)χ(p;Zt)+δ(α)+δ(α)′+2|θ| δnC+2|θ| 1√nC)
)
.
(35)
The equality holds since S(Vt(p))− S(Vt|p) = χ(p;Zt).
Furthermore,
Pr
(
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(Xj,l)−Θtn‖1 > 2−
√
n 18 βˆ(α) + 40 8
√
ǫ ∀tn ∀j
)
≤ Jn|θ|n2n(
∑
t,x r(t,x)S(V(t,x))+δ(α)
· exp
(
−Ln ǫ
3
2 ln 2
(1− 2−
√
n 12 βˆ(α))2
n(−∑t q(t)χ(p;Zt)+δ(α)+δ(α)′+2|θ| δnC+2|θ| 1√nC)
)
.
(36)
Let φjt be the quantum state at the output of wiretapper’s channel when
the channel state is t and j has been sent. We have
∑
t∈θ
q(t)χ (p;Zt)− χ
(
p;
∑
t
q(t)Zt
)
=
∑
t∈θ
q(t)S

 Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
φ
j
t

−∑
t∈θ
Jn∑
j=1
q(t)
1
Jn
S
(
φ
j
t
)
− S

 1
Jn
∑
t∈θ
Jn∑
j=1
q(t)φjt

+ Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
S
(∑
t∈θ
q(t)φjt
)
.
Let HT be a |θ|-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by an orthonormal basis
{|t〉 : t = 1, · · · , |θ|}. Let HJ be a Jn dimensional Hilbert space spanned by
an orthonormal basis {|j〉 : j = 1, · · · , Jn}. We define
ϕJTH
n
:=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
t∈θ
q(t)|j〉〈j| ⊗ |t〉〈t| ⊗ φjt .
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We have
ϕJH
n
= trT
(
ϕJTH
n
)
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
t∈θ
q(t)|j〉〈j| ⊗ φjt ;
ϕTH
n
= trJ
(
ϕJTH
n
)
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
t∈θ
q(t)|t〉〈t| ⊗ φjt ;
ϕH
n
= trJT
(
ϕJTH
n
)
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
t∈θ
q(t)φjt .
Thus,
S(ϕJH
n
) = H(Runi) +
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
(∑
t∈θ
q(t)φjt
)
;
S(ϕTH
n
) = H(Yq) +
∑
t∈θ
q(t)S

 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
φ
j
t

 ;
S(ϕJTH
n
) = H(Runi) +H(Yq) +
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
t∈θ
q(t)S
(
φ
j
t
)
,
where Yq is a random variable on θ with distribution q(t).
By strong subadditivity of von Neumann entropy, it holds that S(ϕJH
n
)+
S(ϕTH
n
) ≥ S(ϕHn) + S(ϕjTHn ), therefore
∑
t
q(t)χ (p;Zt)− χ
(
p;
∑
t
q(t)Zt
)
≥ 0 . (37)
For an arbitrary ζ, we define Ln = ⌈2maxtn χ(p;Ztn )+nζ⌉, and choose a
suitable α, β¯(α), and sufficiently large n such that 6β¯(α) + 2δ(α) +2δ(α)′
+2|θ| δnC +2|θ| 1√nC ≤ ζ. By (37), if n is sufficiently large, we have Ln ≥
⌈2n(
∑
t q(t)χ(p;Zt)+ζ)⌉ and
Ln
ǫ3
2 ln 2
(1 − 2−
√
n 12 βˆ(α))2
n(−∑t q(t)χ(p;Zt)+δ(α)+δ(α)′+2|θ| δnC+2|θ| 1√nC) > 2
1
2nζ .
When n is sufficiently large for any positive ϑ it holds that
Jn|θ|n2n(
∑
t,x r(t,x)S(V(t,x))+δ(α) exp(−2 14nζ)
≤ 2−nϑ
and
2−
√
n 18 βˆ(α) + 40 8
√
ǫ ≤ 2−
√
n 116 βˆ(α) .
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Thus for sufficiently large n we have
Pr
(
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(Xj,l)−Θtn‖1 ≤ 2−
√
n 116 βˆ(α) ∀tn ∀j
)
≥ 1− 2nϑ (38)
for any positive ̺.
Now we have Jn · Ln < 2n(mins χ(p;Bs)−µ).
In [12] and [14], the following was shown (using results of [31]). Let {X˙j,l}j∈{1,...,Jn},l∈{1,...,Ln}
be a family of random variables taking value according to p˙ ∈ P(An). If n is
sufficiently large, and if Jn ·Ln ≤ 2mins n(χ(p˙;Bs)−µ) for an arbitrary positive µ
there exists a projection qxn on H for every x
n ∈ An and positive constants β
and γ, such that for any (s, j, l) ∈ θ × {1, . . . , Jn} × {1, . . . , Ln}, it holds that
Pr
p˙
[
tr
(
W
⊗n
s (X˙j,l)DX˙j,l
)
≥ 1− |θ|2−n1/16β
]
> 1− 2−nγ , (39)
where for j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, l ∈ {1, . . . , Ln}, we have
DX˙j,l :=

∑
j′,l′
qX˙j′ ,l′


− 12
qX˙j,l

∑
j′,l′
qX˙j′,l′


− 12
.
Notice that by this definition, for any realization {x˙j,l : j, l} of {X˙j,l : j, l} it
holds that
∑Jn
j=1
∑Ln
l=1Dx˙j,l ≤ idH⊗n .
(Actually in [20], it was shown that there exists a collection of positive
semidefinite operators {Ds,X˙j,l : s ∈ θ, j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, l ∈ {1, . . . , Ln}} such
that for any s, j, and l it holds that
Pr
[
tr
(
W
⊗n
s (X˙j,l)Ds,X˙j,l
)
≥ 1− 2|θ|2−nβ
]
> 1− 2−nγ ,
and for any realization {x˙j,l : j, l} of {X˙j,l : j, l} it holds that
∑
s∈θ
∑Jn
j=1
∑Ln
l=1Ds,x˙j,l ≤
idH⊗n .)
For any given s ∈ θ, it holds that
W
⊗n
s (p
n)−W⊗ns (p′n)
=
(
1− 1
P (Tnp,δ)
) ∑
an∈Tnp,δ
pn(an)W
⊗n
s (a
n) +
∑
an /∈Tnp,δ
pn(an)W
⊗n
s (a
n) .
Thus, we have
∣∣∣tr(W⊗ns (pn)−W⊗ns (p′n))∣∣∣ ≤ 2P (Tnp,δ) ≤ 2−nη(δ) for a posi-
tive η(δ).
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Lemma 4 (Fannes-Audenaert Ineq., cf. [30], [9]) Let Φ and Ψ be two
quantum states in a d-dimensional complex Hilbert space and ‖Φ−Ψ‖1 ≤ µ <
1
e , then
|S(Φ)− S(Ψ)| ≤ µ log(d− 1) + h(µ) , (40)
where h(ν) := −ν log ν − (1 − ν) log(1 − ν) for ν ∈ [0, 1].
The Fannes Inequality was first introduced in [30] where it has been shown
that |S(Φ) − S(Ψ)| ≤ µ log d − µ logµ. In [9], the result of [30] has been im-
proved, and (40) has been proved.
By Lemma 4 for any positive ω, if n is sufficiently large, we have
∣∣∣S (W⊗ns (pn))− S (W⊗ns (p′n))∣∣∣
≤ 2−nη(δ) log(dn − 1) + h(2−nη(δ))
≤ ω .
Furthermore, we have∣∣∣ ∑
an∈Tnp,δ
p′n(an)S
(
W
⊗n
s (a
n)
)
−
∑
an∈Tnp,δ
p′n(an)S
(
W
⊗n
s (a
n)
)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣
(
1− 1
P (Tnp,δ)
) ∑
an∈Tnp,δ
pn(an)S
(
W
⊗n
s (a
n)
)
+
∑
an /∈Tnp,δ
pn(an)S
(
W
⊗n
s (a
n)
)∣∣∣
≤ 2P (Tnp,δ) max
an∈An
S
(
W
⊗n
s (a
n)
)
≤ ω
for any positive ω, if n is sufficiently large.
We now have∣∣χ(p;B⊗ns )− χ(p′;B⊗ns )∣∣
≤
∣∣∣S (W⊗ns (pn))− S (W⊗ns (p′n))∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣ ∑
an∈Tnp,δ
p′n(an)S
(
W
⊗n
s (a
n)
)
−
∑
an∈Tnp,δ
p′n(an)S
(
W
⊗n
s (a
n)
)∣∣∣
≤ 2ω
for any positive ω, if n is sufficiently large.
Thus, when Jn · Ln < 2mins nχ(p;Bs)−µ holds, we also have
Jn · Ln < 2mins nχ(p
′;Bs)−µ (41)
if n is sufficiently large.
26 Holger Boche et al.
By (41), we can apply (39) to Xj,l. We have: If n is sufficiently large, the
event(⋂
s
{
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
max
l∈{1,...,Ln}
tr
(
W
⊗n
s (Xj,l)DXj,l
)
≥ 1− |θ|2−n1/16β
})
∩
(
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(Xj,l)−Θtn‖1 ≤ 2−
√
n 116 βˆ(α) ∀tn ∀j
)
has a positive probability with respect to p′.
This means that for any ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large we can find a
realization xj,l of Xj,l with a positive probability such that for all s ∈ θ,
tn ∈ θn, π ∈ Πn, and j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, we have
Ln∑
l=1
tr
(
W
⊗n
s (xj,l)Dxj,l
)
≥ 1− ǫ , (42)
and
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(xj,l)−Θtn‖1 ≤ 2−
√
n 116 βˆ(α) . (43)
We define for π ∈ Πn its permutation matrix on H⊗n by Pπ . We have
Vtn(π(x
n)) = PπVπ−1(tn)(x
n)P †π . For π ∈ Πn, we define Θtn,π :=
∑
xn∈Tp,δ p
′(xn)Qtn(π(xn)).
We have Θtn,π = Pπ
(∑
xn∈Tp,δ p
′(xn)Qπ−1(tn)(xn)
)
P †π = PπΘπ(tn)P
†
π .
We choose a suitable positive α. For any given j′ ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, we have∥∥∥∥∥
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(π(xj′ ,l))−Θtn,π
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(π(xj′ ,l))−
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(π(xj′ ,l))‖1
+ ‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qtn(π(xj′ ,l))−Θtn,π‖1
≤
Ln∑
l=1
2−
√
n 116 βˆ(α) + ‖PπQπ−1(tn)(xj′,l)P †π − PπΘπ(tn)P †π‖1
= 2−
√
n 116 βˆ(α) + ‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qπ−1(tn)(xj′,l)−Θπ−1(tn)‖1
≤ 2−
√
n 116 βˆ(α) +
√
2−
1
2nβ(α) + 2−
1
2nβ(α)
′′
≤ 2−
√
n 132 βˆ(α) , (44)
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where the first inequality is an application of the triangle inequality and the
second is again the triangle inequality combined with (14). The following equal-
ity follows because ‖U · A · U †‖1 = ‖A‖1 for all A ∈ B(H⊗n) and unitary
matrices U ∈ B(H⊗n). At last, we use (43).
By (44), we have
‖ 1
Jn · Ln
Jn∑
j=1
Ln∑
l=1
Vtn(π(xj,l))−Θtn,π‖1
≤ 2−
√
n 132 βˆ(α) .
By Lemma 4 and the inequality (44), for a uniformly distributed random
variable Runi with values in {1, . . . , Jn} and all π ∈ Πn and tn ∈ θn, we have
χ(Runi;Ztn,π)
= S

 Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(π(xj,l))


−
Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
S
(
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(π(xj,l))
)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣S

 Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(π(xj,l))

− S (Θtn,π)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣S(Θtn,π)−
Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
S
(
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Vtn(π(xj,l))
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2 · 2−
√
n 132 βˆ(α) log(nd− 1) + 2h(2−
√
n 132 βˆ(α)) . (45)
By (45), for any positive λ if n is sufficiently large, we have
max
tn∈θn
χ(Runi;Ztn,π) ≤ λ . (46)
For an arbitrary positive δ, let
Jn := 2
nmins∈θ χ(p;Bs)−maxtn∈θn χ(p;Ztn )−nδ .
Now we define a code (E, {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}), by E(xn | j) = 1Ln if xn ∈{xj,l : l ∈ {1, . . . , Ln}, and E(xn | j) = 0 if x 6∈ {xj,l : l ∈ {1, . . . , Ln}, and
Dj :=
1
Ln
∑Ln
l=1Dxj,l . For any positive λ and ǫ if n is sufficiently large, by (42)
and (46), it holds that
max
s∈θ
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
an∈An
En(an|j)tr
(
W
⊗n
s (a
n)Dj
)
≥ 1− ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
max
π∈Πn
χ (Runi;Ztn,π) ≤ ǫ .
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We obtain
Cˆs({(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ}) ≥ min
s∈θ
χ(p;Bs)− lim
n→∞
1
n
max
tn∈θn
χ(p;Ztn) . (47)
The achievability of limn→∞ 1n
(
mins∈θ χ(pU ;B
⊗n
s )−maxtn∈θn χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
is then shown via standard arguments (cf. [27]).
Now we are going to prove the converse.
Let (Cn) = (E(n), {D(n)j : j}) be a sequence of (n, Jn) code such that
max
s∈θ
Pe(Cn, s, n) ≤ λn ,
max
tn∈θn
max
π∈Πn
χ (Runi;Ztn,π) ≤ ǫn ,
where limn→∞ λn = 0 and limn→∞ ǫn = 0, where Runi is the uniform distri-
bution on {1, · · ·Jn}.
It is known (cf. ([41])) that the capacity of a classical-quantum channel W
cannot exceed I(Runi;B). Since the capacity of a compound classical-quantum
channel (W s)s∈θ cannot exceed the worst channel in {W s : s ∈ θ}, its capacity
is bounded by 1n (mins∈θ χ(pU ;Bs). The enhanced achievable secrecy rate for
the compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel cannot
exceed the capacity without a wiretapper; thus for any ξ > 0 let us choose
ǫn =
1
2ξ, if n is sufficiently large, the secrecy rate of (Cn) cannot be greater
than
min
s∈θ
I(Runi;Bs)− ξ
≤ min
s∈θ
I(Runi;Bs)− 1
n
max
tn∈θn
χ(Runi;Ztn)− ξ + 1
n
ǫn
≤ min
s∈θ
I(Runi;Bs)− 1
n
max
tn∈θn
χ(Runi;Ztn)− 1
2
ξ
= min
s∈θ
H(Runi) +H(Bs)−H(RuniBs)− 1
n
max
tn∈θn
χ(Runi;Ztn)− 1
2
ξ
≤ min
s∈θ
χ(Runi;Bs)− 1
n
max
tn∈θn
χ(Runi;Ztn)− 1
2
ξ
≤ 1
n
max
Λn
(min
s∈θ
χ(pU ;B
n
s )− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)− 1
2
ξ . (48)
The third inequality holds because Runi → A → {B⊗ns , Ztn : s, tn} is always
a Markov chain.
This and (47) prove Theorem 1. ⊓⊔
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Corollary 1 Let θ := {1, · · · , T } be a finite index set. Let θ := {1, 2 · · · } be
an infinite index set. Let {(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ} be a compound-arbitrarily
varying wiretap classical-quantum channel. We have
Cˆs({(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ}) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Λn
(
inf
s∈θ
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
s )−max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
.
Proof For a linear map W : S(H ′) → S(H ′′) let
‖W‖♦ := sup
n∈N
max
a∈S(Cn⊗H′),‖a‖1=1
‖(In ⊗W )(a)‖1 . (49)
It is known [37] that this norm is multiplicative, i.e., ‖W ⊗W ′‖♦ = ‖W‖♦ ·
‖W ′‖♦.
A τ -net in the space of the completely positive trace-preserving maps
S(H ′) → S(H ′′) is a finite set (W (k))K
k=1
of completely positive trace-preserving
maps S(H ′) → S(H ′′) with the property that for each completely positive
trace-preserving mapW : S(H ′) → S(H ′′), there is at least one k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
with ‖W −W (k)‖♦ < τ .
Lemma 5 (τ−net [34]) Let H ′ and H ′′ be finite-dimensional complex Hilbert
spaces. For any τ ∈ (0, 1], there is a τ-net of quantum channels (W (k))K
k=1
in the space of the completely positive trace-preserving maps S(H ′) → S(H ′′)
with K ≤ ( 3τ )2d
′4
, where d′ = dimH ′.
We now consider a θ such that |θ| is not finite. For n ∈ N we define τn := n2.
{τn : n ∈ N} is a series of positive constants such that ( 3τn )2d
′4
< 2
1
2n
1/16β and
limn→∞ nτn = 0. By Lemma 5, there exists a finite set θτn
′
with |θτn
′| ≤
( 3τn )
2d′4 and τn-nets
(
W s′
)
s′∈θτn
′ , (Vs′ )s′∈θτn
′ such that for every t ∈ θ we can
find a s′ ∈ θτn
′
with
∥∥W s −W s′∥∥♦ ≤ τn.
We assume that the sender’s encoding is restricted to transmitting an in-
dexed finite set of quantum states {ρx : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(H ′⊗n).
By Theorem 1, the legitimate transmitters are able to build a code C2 =
{E, {Dj : j}} such that for all s′′ ∈ θτn
′
, t ∈ θ, and π ∈ Πn, it holds that
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)tr
(
W
⊗n
s′′ (ρxn)D
n
j
)
≥ 1−( 3
τn
)2d
′4
2−n
1/16β ≥ 1−2−12n1/16β ,
(50)
χ(Runi;Z
n
t,π) ≤ 2−nυ . (51)
Let |ψxn〉〈ψxn | ∈ S(H ′⊗n⊗H ′⊗n) be an arbitrary purification of the quan-
tum state ρxn , then tr
[(
W
⊗n
s −W
⊗n
s′
)
(ρxn)
]
= tr
(
trH′⊗n
[
I⊗nH′ ⊗ (W
⊗n
s −W
⊗n
s′ ) (|ψxn〉〈ψxn |)
])
.
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We have
tr
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)
(
W
⊗n
s −W
⊗n
s′
)
(ρxn)
∣∣∣∣∣
= tr
( ∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)trH′⊗n
∣∣∣I⊗NH′ ⊗ (W⊗ns −W⊗ns′ ) (|ψxn〉〈ψxn |)∣∣∣
)
= tr
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)I⊗nH′ ⊗ (W
⊗n
s −W
⊗n
s′ ) (|ψxn〉〈ψxn |)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)
∥∥∥I⊗nH′ ⊗ (W⊗ns −W⊗Ns′ ) (|ψxn〉〈ψxn |)∥∥∥
1
≤
∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)‖W⊗ns −W
⊗n
s′ ‖♦ · ‖(|ψxn〉〈ψxn |)‖1
≤ Nτn .
The second equality follows from the definition of trace. The third inequality
follows by the definition of ‖ · ‖♦. The second inequality follows from the facts
that ‖ (|ψxn〉〈ψxn |) ‖1 = 1 and
∥∥∥W⊗ns −W⊗Ns′ ∥∥∥
♦
=
∥∥∥(W s −W s′)⊗N∥∥∥
♦
=
N ·
∥∥W s −W s′∥∥♦, since ‖ · ‖♦ is multiplicative.
It follows that∣∣∣∣ 1Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)tr
(
W
⊗n
s (ρxn)D
n
j
)
− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)tr
(
W
⊗n
s′ (ρxn)D
n
j
)∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)
∣∣∣tr [(W⊗ns −W⊗ns′ ) (ρxn)Dnj ]∣∣∣
≤ 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)tr
[(
W
⊗n
s −W
⊗n
s′
)
(ρxn)D
n
j
]
≤ 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)tr
[(
W
⊗n
s −W
⊗n
s′
)
(ρxn)
]
≤ 1
Jn
Jnnτn
= nτn . (52)
By (52), we have
sup
s∈θ
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn | j)tr
(
W
⊗n
s (ρxn)D
n
j
)
≥ 1− λτn − nτn .
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Thus,
Cˆs({(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ}) ≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
(inf
s∈θ
χ(p;B⊗ns )− max
tn∈θn
χ(p;Ztn)) . (53)
The achievability of limn→∞ 1n
(
mins∈θ χ(pU ;Bs) − maxtn∈θn χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
is then shown via standard arguments.
The proof of the converse is similar to those given in the proof of Theorem
1. ⊓⊔
Corollary 2 Let θ and θ be finite index sets. Let {(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ} be a
compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel. The secrecy
capacity of {(W s, Vt) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ} is equal to
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Λn
(
min
s∈θ
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
s )− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
.
Proof The corollary follows immediately from the fact that the enhanced se-
crecy capacity of a compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum
channel is less or equal to its secrecy capacity. ⊓⊔
4 Secrecy Capacity of Arbitrarily Varying Classical-Quantum
Wiretap Channel
In this section, we use the results of Section 3 to prove our main result: the
formula for the secrecy capacities under common randomness assisted coding
of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
Theorem 2 Let θ := {1, · · · , T } be a finite index set. Let (Wt, Vt)t∈θ be an
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. We have
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; cr)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Λn
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
. (54)
Here Conv((Bt)t∈θ) is the convex hull of {Bt : t ∈ θ}.
Proof i) Achievement
Our idea is similar to the results for classical arbitrarily varying wiretap
channel in [39]: Applying Ahlswede’s robustification technique (cf. [13]), we
use the results of Section 3 to show the existence of a common randomness
assisted quantum code. Additionally, we have to consider the security.
We denote the set of distribution function on θ by P(θ). For every q ∈ P(θ),
we define a classical-quantum channel W q :=
∑
s∈θ q(s)Ws. We now define a
compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel by
{(W q, Vt); q ∈ P(θ), t ∈ θ} .
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We fix a probability distribution p ∈ A. We choose arbitrarily ǫ > 0, δ > 0,
and ζ > 0. Let
Jn = ⌊2n infBq∈Conv((Bs)s∈θ) χ(p;Bq)−maxtn∈θn χ(p;Ztn )−nδ⌋ .
By Corollary 1, if n is sufficiently large, there exists an (n, Jn) code C =(
En, {Dnj : j = 1, · · ·Jn}
)
such that
max
q∈P(θ)
1− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(W q(E
n( |j))Dnj ) < ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
max
π∈Πn
χ (Runi;Ztn,π) < ζ .
Similar to the proofs in [13], we now apply Ahlswede’s robustification tech-
nique.
Lemma 6 (cf. [3], [4], and [5]) Let S be a finite set and n ∈ N. If a function
f : Sn → [0, 1] satisfies∑
sn∈Sn
f(sn)q(s1)q(s2) · · · q(sn) ≥ 1− ǫ ,
for all q ∈ P(θ) and a positive ǫ ∈ [0, 1], then
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
f(π(sn)) ≥ 1− 3(n+ 1)|S|ǫ . (55)
We define a function f : θn → [0, 1] by
f(tn) :=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(Wtn(E
n( |j))Dnj ) .
For every q ∈ P(θ) we have∑
tn∈θn
f(tn)q(t1) · · · q(tn)
=
∑
tn∈θn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(Wtn(E
n( |j))Dnj )q(t1) · · · q(tn)
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
( ∑
tn∈θn
q(t1) · · · q(tn)Wtn(En( |j))Dnj
)
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(W q(E
n( |j))Dnj )
> 1− 2−nβ/2 .
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Applying Lemma 6, we have
1− 3(n+ 1)|θ|2−nβ/2
≤ 1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
f(π(tn))
=
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(Wπ(tn)(E
n( |j))Dnj )
=
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
an∈An
En(an|j)tr(Wπ(tn)(an)Dnj )
=
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
an∈An
En(an|j)tr(Wtn(π−1(an))P †πDnj Pπ) , (56)
where for π ∈ Πn, Pπ is its permutation matrix on H⊗n.
We now define our common randomness assisted quantum code by
{(
π ◦ En, {PπDnj P †π , j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}}
)
: π ∈ Πn
}
.
PπD
n
j P
†
π is Hermitian and positive semidefinite. Furthermore, it holds that∑Jn
j=1 PπD
n
j P
†
π =
∑Jn
j=1 PπidH⊗nP
†
π = idH⊗n .
By (56), and by the fact that
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi;Ztn,π)
≤ max
tn∈θn
max
π∈Πn
χ (Runi;Ztn,π)
< ζ ,
for any positive ε when n is sufficiently large, it holds that:
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; cr) ≥ inf
Bq∈Conv((Bs)s∈θ)
χ(p;Bq)− lim
n→∞
1
n
max
tn∈θn
χ(p;Ztn)−ε .
(57)
The achievability of limn→∞ 1n
(
minBq∈Conv((Bs)s∈θ) χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )−maxtn∈θn χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
is then shown via standard arguments (cf. [27]).
ii) Converse
Now we are going to prove the converse. Similar to the results for classical
arbitrarily varying wiretap channel in [39], we limit the amount of common
randomness.
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Let ({Cγn : γ ∈ Γ}) be a sequence of (n, Jn) common randomness assisted
codes such that
max
s∈θ
1
|Γ |
|Γ |∑
γ=1
Pe(Cγn, tn) ≤ λn , (58)
max
tn∈θn
1
|Γ |
|Γ |∑
γ=1
χ (Runi;ZCγ ,tn) ≤ ǫn , (59)
where limn→∞ λn = 0 and limn→∞ ǫn = 0.
We consider a |Γ |-long sequence of outputs (1, · · · , |Γ |) has been given by
the common randomness and a n |Γ |-long block has been sent. The legitimate
receiver obtains the quantum states {Bγq : γ ∈ Γ}. By (58), he is able to
decode 2n|Γ | log Jn messages. By [13], for every Bq ∈ Conv((Bs)s∈θ) we have
log Jn ≤ 1|Γ |
1
n
|Γ |∑
γ=1
χ(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q ) ,
and by (59), for and every tn ∈ θn, we have
1
n
log Jn ≤ 1|Γ |
1
n
|Γ |∑
γ=1
(χ(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q )− χ(Runi;Zγtn)) + ǫn .
Lemma 7 Let c > 0. For every q ∈ P(θ) and sn ∈ θn, let a function Iq,sn :
Γ → [0, c] be given. We assume that these functions satisfy the following: for
every γ ∈ Γ and sn ∈ θn
|Iq,sn(γ)− Iq′,sn(γ)| ≤ f(δ) ,
if q, q′ ∈ P(θ) satisfy ‖q − q′‖1 ≤ δ for some f(δ) which tends to 0 as δ tends
to 0. We write µ(Iq,sn) :=
∑
γ∈Γ µ(γ)Iq,sn(γ), where µ(γ) is the probability of
γ. Then, for every ε > 0 and sufficiently large n, there are L = n2 realizations
γ1, · · · , γL such that
1
L
L∑
l=1
Iq,sn(γl) ≥ (1 − ε)µ(Iq,sn)− ε
for every q ∈ P(θ) and sn ∈ θn.
Proof Let 0 < δ < 12 and K be a positive integer. We denote the set of possible
types of sequences of length K by PK0 (θ). As in the approximation argument
in [17], one can show that every q ∈ P(θ) is at most a distance δ away from
some q′ ∈ PK0 (θ) if K ≥ 2 |θ|−1δ .
Let K := ⌈2 |θ|−1δ ⌉. Then, |PK0 (θ)| ≤
(
2 |θ|δ
)|θ|
. This approximating set is
used to handle the infinite set P(θ).
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Now let G1, · · · , GL be i.i.d. random variables with values in Γ and dis-
tributed according to µ. Set µ∗ := minq∈P(θ) minsn∈θn µ(Iq,sn). Using the union
bound and the Chernoff bound (cf. [28]), we obtain
Pr
{
1
L
L∑
l=1
Iq,sn(Gl) < µ(Iq,sn) ∀q ∈ PK0 (θ) ∀sn ∈ θn
}
≤ exp
(
|θ| log
(
2|θ|
δ
)
+ n log |θ| − Lǫ
2µ∗
3c
)
.
This, probability is smaller than 1 if L tends to infinity faster than n, e.g., if
L = n2.
Thus we have proved the existence of γ1, · · · , γL which satisfies
1
L
L∑
l=1
Iq,sn(γl) ≥ (1− ǫ)µ(Iq,sn )
for every q ∈ PK0 (θ) and sn ∈ θn. Now let q ∈ P(θ) be arbitrary and let
q′ ∈ PK0 (θ) satisfy ‖q − q′‖1 ≤ δ. Then
1
L
L∑
l=1
Iq,sn(γl)
≥ 1
L
L∑
l=1
Iq′,sn(γl)− f(δ)
≥ (1− ǫ)µ(Iq′,sn)− f(δ)
≥ (1− ǫ)µ(Iq,sn )− (2 − ǫ)f(δ) .
Choosing δ sufficiently small proves the claim of the lemma. ⊓⊔
For q ∈ Conv({s : s ∈ θ}), we define
Iq,sn(γ) :=
1
n
(
χ(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q )− χ(Runi;Zγtn)
)
.
In [24], the continuity of q → 1nχ(Runi;Bγ⊗nq ) has been shown; thus,
there is a f(δ) such that |Iq,sn(γ) − Iq′,sn(γ)| 1n 1|Γ |
∑|Γ |
γ=1(χ(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q ) −
1
n
1
|Γ |
∑|Γ |
γ=1(χ(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q′ ) ≤ f(δ) for a f(δ) that fulfills f(δ) → 0 when
‖q− q′‖1 = δ → 0. By Lemma 7, there is a set Γ ′ ⊂ Γ such that |Γ ′| = n2 and
1
|Γ ′|
1
n
∑
γ′∈Γ ′
(
χ(Runi;B
γ′⊗n
q )− χ(Runi;Zγ
′
tn)
)
≥ (1− ε) 1
n
1
|Γ |
∑
γ∈Γ
(
χ(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q )− χ(Runi;Zγtn)
)
,
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where Bγ
′
q and Z
γ
tn are the quantum states at the output of legitimate receiver
channel and the wiretapper’s channel, respectively, when the output of the
common randomness is γ′.
Thus,
1
n
log Jn ≤ 1
1− ε
1
n
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
(
χ(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q )− χ(Runi;Zγtn) + ǫn
)
. (60)
To prove the converse, we now consider
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
1
n
(
χ(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q )− χ(Runi;Zγtn)
)− 1
n
(
χ(Runi;B
⊗n
q )− χ(Runi;Ztn)
)
=
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
1
n
(
χ(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q )− χ(Runi;Zγtn)
)
− 1
n

χ(Runi; 1|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
Bγ⊗nq )− χ(Runi;
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
Z
γ
tn)


=
1
n
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′

χ(Runi;Bγ⊗nq )− χ(Runi; 1|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
Bγ⊗nq )


− 1
n
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′

χ(Runi;Zγtn) + 1nχ(Runi; 1|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
Z
γ
tn)

 .
Let Guni be the uniformly distributed random variable with value in Γ
′.
We have
1
n
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
χ(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q )
=
1
n
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
I(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q )
=
1
n
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
(H(Runi)−H(Runi|Bγ⊗nq ))
=
1
n
H(Runi)− 1
n
H(Runi|Bγ⊗nq , Γ ′)
≤ 1
n
H(Runi)− 1
n
H(Runi|Bq) +H(Guni)
=
1
n
I(Runi;B
⊗n
q ) +H(Guni)
=
1
n
χ

Runi; 1|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
Bγ⊗nq

+H(Guni)
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=
1
n
χ

Runi; 1|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
Bγ⊗nq

+ 2 logn . (61)
Let φj,γtn be the quantum state at the output of the wiretapper’s channel
when the channel state is tn, the output of the common randomness is γ, and
j has been sent.
We have
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
χ (Runi;Z
γ
tn)− χ

Runi; 1|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
Z
γ
tn


=
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
S

 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
φ
j,γ
tn

− 1|Γ ′| 1Jn
∑
γ∈Γ ′
Jn∑
j=1
S
(
φ
j,γ
tn
)
− S

 1
|Γ ′|
1
Jn
∑
γ∈Γ ′
Jn∑
j=1
φ
j,γ
tn

+ 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S

 1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
φ
j,γ
tn

 . (62)
Let HG be a |Γ ′|-dimensional Hilbert space, spanned by an orthonormal
basis {|i〉 : i = 1, · · · , |Γ ′|}. LetHJ be a Jn-dimensional Hilbert space, spanned
by an orthonormal basis {|j〉 : j = 1, · · · , Jn}. Similar to (37), we define
ϕJGH
n
:=
1
Jn
1
|Γ ′|
Jn∑
j=1
∑
γ∈Γ ′
|j〉〈j| ⊗ |i〉〈i| ⊗ φj,γtn .
By strong subadditivity of von Neumann entropy, it holds that S(ϕJH
n
)+
S(ϕGH
n
) ≥ S(ϕHn) + S(ϕJGHn), therefore
1
|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
χ (Runi;Z
γ
tn)− χ

Runi; 1|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
Z
γ
tn

 ≥ 0 . (63)
By (61) and (63), we have
χ(Runi;Bq)− 1
n
χ(Runi;Ztn)+2 logn ≥ 1|Γ ′|
∑
γ∈Γ ′
1
n
(
χ(Runi;B
γ⊗n
q )− χ(Runi;Zγtn)
)
.
Thus for every Bq ∈ Conv((Bs)s∈θ) and every tn ∈ θn we have
1
n
log Jn ≤ 1
1− ε
1
n
(
χ(Runi;B
⊗n
q )− χ(Runi;Ztn) + ǫn + 2
1
n
log n
)
. (64)
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we have 1n
(
infBq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ) χ(Runi;B
⊗n
q )
−maxtn∈θn χ(Runi;Ztn)
)
≤ 1n maxΛn
(
infBq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ) χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )−maxtn∈θn χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
.
The converse has been shown. (57) and (64) prove Theorem 2.
⊓⊔
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Corollary 3 Let {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel.
1) Let X and Y be finite sets. If I(X,Y ) > 0 holds for a random variable
(X,Y ) which is distributed to a joint probability distribution p ∈ P (X,Y), then
the (X,Y ) correlation assisted secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is equal to
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Λn
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
.
2)If the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not
symmetrizable, then the deterministic secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is
equal to
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Λn
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
.
Proof 1) follows immediately from Theorem 2 and the results of [22].
To show 2) we use a technique similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1 in
[22]: We build a two-part code word which consists of a non-secure code word
and a common randomness assisted secure code word. The first part is used to
create the common randomness for the sender and the legitimate receiver. The
second part is a common randomness assisted secure code word transmitting
the message to the legitimate receiver.
We consider the Markov chain U → A → {B⊗nq , Ztn : q, tn}, where we
define the classical channel U → A by TU . Let
Jn = ⌊2n infBq∈Conv((Bs)s∈θ) χ(pU ;Bq)−maxtn∈θn χ(pU ;Ztn )−nδ⌋ .
By Theorem 2, for any positive ǫ if n is sufficiently large, there is an (n, Jn)
code
(
En, {Dnj : j = 1, · · ·Jn}
)
for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel {(Wt ◦ TU , Vt ◦ TU ) : t ∈ θ} such that
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
an∈An
En(an|j)tr(Wtn(π−1(an))P †πDnj Pπ) ≥ 1− ǫ
and
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi;Ztn,π) ≤ ǫ .
By Theorem 3.1.2 in [22], for any positive λ if n is sufficiently large, there is an
(n, Jn) common randomness assisted code {C1, C2, · · · , Cn3} for the arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt ◦ TU , Vt ◦ TU ) : t ∈ θ} such
that
max
tn∈θn
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
Pe(Ci, tn) < λ ,
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and
max
tn∈θn
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
χ (Runi, ZCi,tn) < λ .
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1.1 in [22], for any positive ϑ if {Wt : t ∈ θ} is
not symmetrizable and n is sufficiently large, there is a code
((
c
µ(n)
i
)
i∈{1,··· ,n3}
, {Dµ(n)i :
i ∈ {1, · · · , n3}}
)
with deterministic encoder of length µ(n), where 2µ(n) =
o(n) for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ} such that
1− 1
n3
n3∑
i=1
tr(Wtn(c
µ(n)
i )D
µ(n)
i ) ≤ ϑ .
We now can construct a code Cdet =
(
Eµ(n)+n,
{
D
µ(n)+n
j : j = 1, · · · , Jn
})
,
where for aµ(n)+n = (aµ(n), an) ∈ Aµ(n)+n
Eµ(n)+n(aµ(n)+n|j) =
{
1
n3E
n
i (a
n|j) if aµ(n) = cµ(n)i
0 else
,
and
D
µ(n)+n
j :=
n3∑
i=1
D
µ(n)
i ⊗Dni,j .
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1.1 in [22], for any positive λ if n is suffi-
ciently large, we have
max
tµ(n)+n∈θµ(n)+n
Pe(Cdet, tµ(n)+n) < λ ,
max
tµ(n)+n∈θµ(n)+n
χ
(
Runi, ZCdet,tµ(n)+n
)
< λ .
⊓⊔
Remark 3 For the proof of Corollary 3, 2), it is important to assume that((
c
µ(n)
i
)
i∈{1,··· ,n3}
, {Dµ(n)i : i ∈ {1, · · · , n3}}
)
is a code for the channel
{(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} and not for {(Wt ◦ TU , Vt ◦ TU ) : t ∈ θ}, since it may
happen that {Wt ◦ TU : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable although {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not
symmetrizable, as the following example shows:
We assume that {Wt : t ∈ θ} :P (A) → S(H) is not symmetrizable, but
there is a subset A′ ⊂ A such that {Wt : t ∈ θ} limited on A′ is symmetrizable.
We choose a TU such that for every u ∈ U there is a ∈ A′ such that TU (a |
u) = 1, and TU (a | u) = 0 for all a ∈ A \ A′ and u ∈ U. It is clear that
{Wt ◦ TU : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable (cf. also [35] for an example for classical
channels).
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5 Investigation of Secrecy Capacity’s Continuity
In this section we show that the secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel under common randomness assisted quan-
tum coding is continuous in the following sense:
Corollary 4 For an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ}, where Wt : P(A) → S(H) and Vt : P(A) → S(H ′) and a positive δ,
let Cδ be the set of all arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels
{(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}, where W ′t : P(A) → S(H) and V ′t : P(A) → S(H ′), such
that
max
a∈A
‖Wt(a)−W ′t(a)‖1 < δ
and
max
a∈A
‖Vt(a)− V ′t(a)‖1 < δ
for all t ∈ θ.
For any positive ǫ there is a positive δ such that for all {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}
∈ Cδ we have
|Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; cr)− Cs({((W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ}; cr)| ≤ ǫ . (65)
Proof By Corollary 3, the secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Λn
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Ztn)
)
,
and for every {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ the secrecy capacity of {(W ′t, V ′t) :
t ∈ θ} is
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Λn
(
inf
B′q∈Conv((B′t)t∈θ)
χ(pU ;B
′⊗n
q )− max
tn∈θn
χ(pU ;Z
′
tn)
)
,
where B′t is the resulting quantum state at the output of W ′t and Z ′t is the
resulting quantum state at the output of V ′t.
To analyze |χ(p;Ztn)−χ(p;Z ′tn)|, we use the technique introduced in [33]
and apply the following lemma given in [8].
Lemma 8 (Alicki-Fannes Inequality) Suppose we have a composite system
PQ with components P and Q. Let GP and GQ be Hilbert space of P and Q,
respectively. Suppose we have two bipartite quantum states φPQ and σPQ in
S(GPQ) such that ‖φPQ − σPQ‖1 = ǫ < 1, it holds that
S(P | Q)ρ − S(P | Q)σ ≤ 4ǫ log(d− 1)− 2h(ǫ) , (66)
where d is the dimension of GP and h(ǫ) is defined as in Lemma 4.
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In contrast to [8], we consider here classical-quantum channels instead of
quantum-quantum channels.
We fix an n ∈ N and a tn = (t1, · · · tn) ∈ θn. For any an ∈ An we have
|S (Vtn(an))− S (V ′tn(an))|
=
∣∣∣∣
n∑
k=1
S
(
V(t1,···tk−1) ⊗ V ′(tk,···tn)(an)
)− S (V(t1,···tk) ⊗ V ′(tk+1,···tn)(an))
∣∣∣∣
≤
n∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣S (V(t1,···tk−1) ⊗ V ′(tk,···tn)(an))− S (V(t1,···tk) ⊗ V ′(tk+1,···tn)(an))
∣∣∣∣ .
For a k ∈ {1, · · · , n} and an = (a1, · · · an) ∈ An by Lemma 8 we have∣∣∣∣S (V(t1,···tk+1) ⊗ V ′(tk,···tn)(an))− S (V(t1,···tk+1) ⊗ V ′(tk+1,···tn)(an))
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣S (V(t1,···tk) ⊗ V ′(tk,···tn)(an))− S (V(t1,···tk−1) ⊗ V ′(tk+1,···tn)((a1, · · · ak−1, ak+1, · · · an)))
− S (V(t1,···tk) ⊗ V ′(tk+1,···tn)(an))+ S (V(t1,···tk−1) ⊗ V ′(tk+1,···tn)((a1, · · · ak−1, ak+1, · · · an)))
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣S (V ′tk(ak) | V(t1,···tk−1) ⊗ V ′(tk+1,···tn)((a1, · · ·ak−1, ak+1, · · ·an)))
− S (Vtk(ak) | V(t1,···tk−1) ⊗ V ′(tk+1,···tn)((a1, · · · ak−1, ak+1, · · · an)))
∣∣∣∣
≤ 4δ log(dE − 1)− 2 · h(δ) ,
where dE is the dimension of H
E.
Thus,
|S (Vtn(an))− S (V ′tn(an))| ≤ 4nδ log(dE − 1)− 2n · h(δ) . (67)
For any probability distribution p ∈ P(A), n ∈ N, and tn ∈ θn, we have
|χ(p;Ztn)− χ(p;Z ′tn)|
=
∣∣∣S(∑
a
p(a)Vtn(a))−
∑
a
p(a)S(Vtn(a))
− S(
∑
a
p(a)V ′tn(a)) + S(
∑
a
p(a)V ′tn(a))
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣S(∑
a
p(a)Vtn(a))− S(
∑
a
p(a)V ′tn(a))
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∑
a
p(a)S(V ′tn(a)) −
∑
a
p(a)S(V ′tn(a))
∣∣∣
≤ 8nδ log(dE − 1)− 4n · h(δ) . (68)
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We fix a probability distribution q on θ, a probability distribution p ∈ P(A),
and an n ∈ N. By Lemma 4 we have
|χ(p;Bq)− χ(p;B′q)|
=
∣∣∣∑
t
q(t)S(
∑
a
p(a)Wt(a))−
∑
t
∑
a
q(t)p(a)S(Wt(a))
−
∑
t
q(t)S(
∑
a
p(a)W ′t(a)) + S(
∑
t
∑
a
q(t)p(a)W ′t(a))
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∑
t
q(t)S(
∑
a
p(a)Wt(a))−
∑
t
q(t)S(
∑
a
p(a)W ′t(a))
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∑
t
∑
a
q(t)p(a)S(Wt(a))− S(
∑
t
∑
a
q(t)p(a)W ′t(a))
∣∣∣
≤ 8δ log(dB − 1)− 4 · h(δ) , (69)
where dB is the dimension of H
B.
Thus, for any probability distribution q on θ, n ∈ N, p ∈ P(A), and tn ∈ θn,
we have for all {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ∣∣∣(χ(p;Bq)− 1
n
χ(p;Ztn))− (χ(p;B′q)− 1
n
χ(p;Z ′tn))
∣∣∣
≤ 8δ log(dB − 1) + 8δ log(dE − 1)− 8 · h(δ) . (70)
For any positive ǫ we can find a positive δ such that 8δ log(dB − 1) +
8δ log(dE − 1) − 8 · h(δ) ≤ ǫ.
Thus for all n ∈ N and any positive ǫ we can find a positive δ such that for
all {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} ∈ Cδ∣∣∣(max
p
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bt)t∈θ)
χ(p;Bq)− max
tn∈θn
χ(p;Ztn))
− (max
p
inf
B′q∈Conv((B′t)t∈θ)
χ(p;B′q)− 1
n
max
tn∈θn
χ(p;Z ′tn))
∣∣∣
≤ ǫ . (71)
(71) shows Corollary 4. ⊓⊔
Corollary 5 The deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channel is in general not continuous.
Proof We show Corollary 5 by giving an example.
Let θ := {1, 2}. Let A= {0, 1}. LetHB = C5. Let {|0〉B, |1〉B, |2〉B, |3〉B, |4〉B}
be a set of orthonormal vectors on HB. Let λ be ∈ [0, 1].
For r ∈ [0, 1], let Pr be the probability distribution on A such that Pr(0) = r
and Pr(1) = 1− r. We define a channel Wλ1 : P(A) → S(HB) by
Wλ1 (Pr) = (1− λ)r|0〉〈0|B + (1− λ)(1 − r)|1〉〈1|B + λ|3〉〈3|B ,
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and a channel Wλ2 : P(A) → S(HB) by
Wλ2 (Pr) = (1− λ)r|1〉〈1|B + (1− λ)(1 − r)|2〉〈2|B + λ|4〉〈4|B .
In other words:
Wλ1 (0) = (1− λ)|0〉〈0|B + λ|3〉〈3|B ,
Wλ1 (1) = (1− λ)|1〉〈1|B + λ|3〉〈3|B ,
Wλ2 (0) = (1− λ)|1〉〈1|B + λ|4〉〈4|B ,
Wλ2 (1) = (1− λ)|2〉〈2|B + λ|4〉〈4|B .
LetHE = C5. Let {|0〉E, |1〉E, |2〉E, |3〉E, |4〉E be a set of orthonormal vectors
on HE.
We define a channel V λ1 : P(A) → S(HE) by
V λ1 (Pr) = λr|0〉〈0|E + λ(1 − r)|1〉〈1|E + (1 − λ)|3〉〈3|E ,
and a channel V λ2 : P(A) → S(HE) by
V λ2 (Pr) = λr|1〉〈1|E + λ(1 − r)|2〉〈2|E + (1 − λ)|4〉〈4|E .
In other words:
V λ1 (0) = λ|0〉〈0|E + (1 − λ)|3〉〈3|E ,
V λ1 (1) = λ|1〉〈1|E + (1 − λ)|3〉〈3|E ,
V λ2 (0) = λ|1〉〈1|E + (1 − λ)|4〉〈4|E ,
V λ2 (1) = λ|2〉〈2|E + (1 − λ)|4〉〈4|E .
For every a ∈ A and t ∈ θ we have
‖W 0t (a)−Wλt (a)‖1
= ‖λ|t+ a− 1〉〈t+ a− 1|B − λ|t+ 2〉〈t+ 2|B‖1
= 2λ
and
‖V 0t (a)− V λt (a)‖1
= ‖ − λ|t+ a− 1〉〈t+ a− 1|E + λ|t+ 2〉〈t+ 2|E‖1
= 2λ .
{(Wλt , V λt ) : t ∈ θ} defines an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap
channel for every λ ∈ [0, 1].
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At first, we consider {(W 0t , V 0t ) : t ∈ θ}.
i) The deterministic secrecy capacity of {(W 0t , V 0t ) : t ∈ θ} is equal to zero.
We set
τ(1 | 0) = 0 ; τ(2 | 0) = 1 ;
τ(1 | 1) = 1 ; τ(2 | 1) = 0 .
It holds that
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | 0)W 0t (1) = |1〉〈1|E =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | 1)W 0t (0) ,
and of course for every a ∈ A∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a)W 0t (a) =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a)W 0t (a) .
{(W 0t ) : t ∈ θ} is therefore symmetrizable. By [22], we have
Cs({(W 0t , V 0t ) : t ∈ θ}) = 0 . (72)
ii) The secrecy capacity of {(W 0t , V 0t ) : t ∈ θ} under common randomness
assisted quantum coding is positive.
We denote by p′ ∈ P(A) the distribution on A such that p′(1) = p′(2) = 12 .
Let q ∈ [0, 1]. We define Q(1) = q, Q(2) = 1− q. We have
χ
(
p′, {W 0Q(a) : a ∈ A}
)
= −1
2
q log
1
2
q +
1
2
(1− q) log 1
2
(1− q)− 1
2
log
1
2
+ q log q + (1− q) log(1 − q) .
When we differentiate this term by q, we obtain
1
log e
(
−1
2
log
1
2
q − 1
2
+
1
2
log
1
2
(1− q) + 1
2
+ log q + 1− log(1 − q)− 1
)
=
1
2 log e
(log q − log(1− q)) .
log q − log(1 − q) is equal to zero if and only if q = 12 . By further calculation,
one can show that χ
(
p′, {W 0Q(a) : a ∈ A}
)
achieves its minimum when q = 12 .
This minimum is equal to − 12 log 14 + 12 log 12 = 12 > 0. Thus,
max
p
min
q
χ
(
p,B0q
) ≥ 1
2
.
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For all t ∈ θ it holds that V 0t (0) = V 0t (1); therefore for all tn ∈ θn and any
pn ∈ P(An) we have
χ(p;Z0tn)
= S(V 0tn(p
n))−
∑
an∈An
pn(an)S(V 0tn(a
n))
= S(V 0tn(0
n))−
∑
an∈An
pn(an)S(V 0tn(0
n))
= 0 .
Thus,
Cs({(W 0t , V 0t ) : t ∈ θ}, cr) ≥
1
2
− 0 > 0 . (73)
Now we consider {(Wλt , V λt ) : t ∈ θ} when λ 6= 0.
iii) When λ 6= 0, the deterministic secrecy capacity of {(Wλt , V λt ) : t ∈ θ}
is equal to its secrecy capacity of under common randomness assisted quantum
coding.
We suppose that for any a, a′ ∈ A there are two distributions τ(· | a) and
τ(· | a′) on θ such that∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a′) ·Wλt (a) =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a) ·Wλt (a′)
⇒ (1− λ)
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a′)|t+ a− 1〉〈t+ a− 1|B + λτ(1 | a′)|3〉〈3|E + λτ(2 | a′)|4〉〈4|E
= (1− λ)
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a)|t+ a′ − 1〉〈t+ a′ − 1|B + λτ(1 | a)|3〉〈3|E + λτ(2 | a)|4〉〈4|E .
(74)
Since |t + a − 1〉〈t + a − 1|B ∈
{
|0〉〈0|E, |1〉〈1|E, |2〉〈2|E
}
for all t and a, if
λ 6= 0, (74) implies that
τ(t | a′) = τ(t | a)
for all t ∈ θ. This means we have a distribution p´ on θ such that p´(t) = τ(t | a)
for all a ∈ A.
But there is clearly no such distribution p´ such that
∑
t∈θ p´(t)W
λ
t (0) =∑
t∈θ p´(t)W
λ
t (1), because then we would have
p´(1)|0〉〈0|B + p´(2)|1〉〈1|B
= p´(1)|1〉〈1|B + p´(2)|2〉〈2|B .
This would mean p´(1) = p´(2) = 0, which obviously cannot be true. Thus,
(Wλt )t∈θ is not symmetric.
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By [22], if λ 6= 0
Cs({(Wλt , V λt ) : t ∈ θ}) = Cs({(Wλt , V λt ) : t ∈ θ}, cr) . (75)
When λ ց 0 for every a ∈ A and t ∈ θ we have ‖W 0t (a) −Wλt (a)‖1 =
‖V 0t (a)− V λt (a)‖1 = 2λ ց 0.
By Corollary 4, the secrecy capacity of {(Wλt , V λt ) : t ∈ θ} under common
randomness assisted quantum coding is continues. Thus for any positive ε
there is a δ, such that for all λ ∈]0, δ[, we have
Cs({(Wλt , V λt ) : t ∈ θ}) ≥ Cs({(W 0t , V 0t ) : t ∈ θ}, cr)− ε ≥
1
2
− ε . (76)
In other words, when λ 6= 0 tends to zero, the deterministic secrecy capacity
of {(Wλt , V λt ) : t ∈ θ} tends to the secrecy capacity of {(W 0t , V 0t ) : t ∈ θ}
under common randomness assisted quantum coding, which is positive, but
the deterministic secrecy capacity of {(W 0t , V 0t ) : t ∈ θ} is equal to zero. Hence,
the deterministic secrecy capacity of {(Wλt , V λt ) : t ∈ θ} is not continues at
zero. ⊓⊔
Corollary 5 shows that small errors in the description of an arbitrarily vary-
ing classical-quantum wiretap channel may have severe consequences on the
secrecy capacity. Corollary 4 shows that resources are very helpful to protect
these consequences.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we deliver the formula for the secrecy capacities under common
randomness assisted coding of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap
channels. In our previous paper [22], we established the Ahlswede Dichotomy
for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels: Either the deter-
ministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap
channel is zero or it equals its randomness assisted secrecy capacity, depending
on the status whether the legitimate receiver’s channel is symmetrizable or not.
When we combine the results of these two works we can now completely char-
acterize the secrecy capacity formulas for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channels (cf. Corollary 3).
As an application of these results, we turn to the general question: When
is secure message transmission through arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channels continuous? Our results show the discontinuity in general and
demonstrate the importance of shared randomness: it stabilizes the secure
message transmission through arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap
channels.
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